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1 Introduction
Traditionally, the field of security policy has been
associated with conservative worldviews, which
focus on order and avoidance or management of
conflict. Security provision has been about
specialist agencies, expert analysts and top-down
policy approaches. As an academic and policy
field it is highly gendered (Tickner 1995) and
state-centred (Morgenthau 1948 is just one
example among many). It has focused on threats
to strategic national state interests from without
and also within. However, over the past two
decades, this has been challenged from various
quarters. There has been a move to widen the
meaning of security and to recognise that it is
not just about the state but also about citizens.
Security, it is argued, is linked to the wellbeing of
communities, and this must include protection
from hunger, disease, violence and repression, as
well as consolidation of democracy and social
justice (UNDP 1994). The idea of human
security encourages governments, policymakers
and other organisations to give value and
attention to a broader range of threats to life
than is normally recognised, particularly in the
global South.
However, this shift from state-centred to human-
centred security has uncovered the weakness of
the state and the difficulties it faces in
protecting people from complex forms of
insecurity. It has also increased international and
social demands on states, which are now asked to
protect their citizens from chronic threats in a
particular moment in history during which their
ability to provide even basic protection from
physical violence and attack is in crisis and
undermined by global phenomena. The spread of
‘new wars’ in the global South has highlighted
the limitations of state security provision, but
there are also growing problems of urban and
rural violence in countries that had postwar
peace agreements and even in those which have
experienced no war at all. For example, in the
mid-1990s, the number of homicides among
young men aged 15–44 in Brazil was higher than
that of Colombia, a country recognised to be in
the midst of a civil war (Krug et al. 2002).
This weakness of the state security response has
contributed to a gradual erosion of the idea of
security as a public good, as well as loss of faith in
state security provision. Many people already
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depend on private and informal forms of security
and justice provision. Wealth and poverty
determines the choice: private security firms on
the one hand and local gunman on the other.
Some now argue for a shift from the focus on state
provision in favour of more support for non-state
providers in post-conflict and fragile states. They
include commercial, informal and community
forms of justice and security delivery (Baker and
Scheye 2007: 154). In many such contexts, it is
argued, the state sector will simply never deliver
in the short to medium term and alternatives
need to be found based on local realities.
‘Security from below’, we argue, should not be a
substitute for security as a public good. The
challenge, however, is how the latter can be
constructed in contemporary contexts of
multiple violences and insecurity, with weak
states, corrupt and non-accountable security
institutions and with powerful global networks
trafficking arms and drugs that foster violence
and further erode the state’s legitimate
monopoly over the means of violence. Rather
than widen the idea of security to embrace ever
more areas of human interaction, we need to
‘humanise’ security provision, or make it people-
centred but publicly delivered, and in ways that
promote non-violent forms of human interaction,
encourage civil participation and protect women,
children and vulnerable youth from abuse. We
believe that ‘security from below’ is about
encouraging people to think about their security
as they do about their food, livelihood and
human rights; it is of equal importance.
Security provision must be provided by public
institutions, but it needs to be founded on agreed
norms and shared values. It also has to respond
to contextualised needs in ways that are
legitimate and respectful of human rights. These
norms may well have to be constructed from
‘below’. Developing norms and principles which
are compatible with public provision may be one
of the particular challenges of our times, and
there are contexts today where it is not yet
conceivable that the state can or will take on the
task. Indigenous and community forms of justice
may be the only viable forms in some contexts.
However, there are many challenges on what is
meant by publicly agreed norms and shared
values, when these have not yet been
democratically constructed. While there may be
a need to recognise transitional community-level
security and justice forms, these should, we
argue, contribute to building universal norms,
which can help construct effective state provision
rather than substitute for it.
In order to analyse how ‘security from below’
could help humanise security provision in
contexts of chronic violence,2 our article begins
by exploring the implications of the discursive
shift from state-centred to citizen- and human-
centred security. Drawing mostly on examples
from Latin America and based on our initial
research activities in Guatemala and Colombia,
we then explore the signs of the crisis in
practice, as well as the community, market and
donor agency-led responses to it that have
emerged. We critically analyse their limitations
and question how we can move from failing
public provision to security as a fairly distributed
and effective public service. We finally argue that
‘security from below’ in the specific contexts
under discussion, could help analytically, and in
practice, to build norms and principles to inform
contemporary security approaches. By drawing
attention to real and diverse contexts of security
provision, ‘security from below’ seeks to focus on
the relevance and effectiveness of prevailing
forms of public and non-public security provision.
It asks how far these facilitate participation for
social change and democratic development? If
security is to be judged by such criteria, it
requires new debate to be opened up at the
grassroots level, democratically embedding a
sense of what is right and appropriate in
communities, which have become subjected to
the arbitrary imposition of certain concepts of
perverse ‘order’ in the name of security.
2 From state-centred to human-centred security
As an academic field and as a policymaking
enterprise, security has been dominated by a
Western understanding of world politics. It has
been focused on the protection of the
international system born in Europe in the
seventeenth century which regards state
sovereignty and power competition as the driving
forces of international life. Over the last two
decades, however, traditional theories focused on
state survival and power preservation have been
challenged. By denying the alleged universalism
and neutrality of realist definitions of security
obsessed with state security and survival (Wendt
1992; Cox 1981) and criticising the restrictive
focus of traditional security studies as inadequate
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to contemporary realities (Booth 1991; Wyn Jones
1999), scholars and policymakers have been
invited to consider individuals and communities
as the main referents of any security endeavour.
New feminist perspectives have also challenged
the exclusionary traditional discourse of security
by exposing its deep connections with
hierarchical social relations between women and
men, rich and poor and insiders and outsiders
(Tickner 1995: 180). It is now widely accepted
that the protection of individuals and their
liberties and the creation of contexts that enable
human wellbeing are the main challenges of this
century.
All these contributions and the pre-eminence of
the concept of Human Security after the
publication of the UNDP Human Development
Report in 1994 have contributed to taking security
out from the secrecy and closeness associated
with intelligence, military and defence circles.
Although there is still no agreement on the
definition of Human Security, it is generally
accepted that it places the protection and
welfare of individuals as the primary concern of
any security approach, something that seems
difficult to achieve through traditional military
means. Human security is not only a
comprehensive concept, it is also a campaign to
open up security thinking to new fields and to
bring security practices closer to contemporary
human problems. Appealing to the core idea of
‘humanness’, this broadened concept has made
‘security’ a concept of relevance to the left as
well as the right, to women as well as to men, to
the global South3 as well as the global North, to
non-Western societies and to academics and
practitioners of almost all sciences and fields.
This discursive shift in the field of security has
raised new demands on the state. Under the new
paradigm, the state loses its preponderance but
gains responsibilities. Contemporary states must
not only protect individuals and communities
from a wider set of threats, but they should also
create conditions for wellbeing and social justice,
be respectful of democratic values and human
rights and be accountable to citizens. All this
when rather than strengthening their
infrastructural capacity, states have increasingly
lost their ability to restrain the impact of
transnational phenomena, to maintain their
legitimate monopoly of coercion and to be
responsive to local needs.
The human-security approach suggests multi-
layered and multi-area interventions and implies
new political and institutional landscapes at
national and international levels to protect
individuals and communities. However, state
institutions have not substantially changed or
properly adjusted in that direction over the last
two decades. On the contrary, despite national
and international attempts to reform the security
sector in many countries, traditional assumptions,
practices and values are still deeply entrenched in
state institutions and social groups. Public
responses to insecurity very often slip towards
authoritarianisms and they also lack transparency
and accountability. Citizens in heightened states
of fear are often encouraged to support hardline
and authoritarian public responses. At the same
time, neoliberal globalisation has reduced the
emphasis on building public coffers or increasing
public provision, and it has made the possibility of
handing over the provision of some services to
private actors that are regarded as economically
more efficient than the state attractive, including
security.
One of the most evident signs of crises in security
provision is the lack of effective protection from
physical violence, the basic aspect of security. An
estimated seven million violence-caused deaths
occurred in the world, 75 per cent of them civilian,
between 1993 and 2003 (Smith and Braein,
quoted in Hurwitz and Peake 2004: 1). Internal
wars as well as an increase in the levels of crime
and delinquency around the globe, especially but
not exclusively in growing urban concentrations of
the global South, are responsible for most of those
deaths. In its many forms, violence is increasing in
urban as well as in rural areas, affecting the lives
of millions of people, which produces a growing
sense of insecurity that paralyses cooperative
social interaction, decreases wellbeing, obstructs
democratisation and undermines the states’
credibility. In Latin America where, according to
the World Health Organization (WHO), violence
was the first cause of death in 1999, violence
seems to be growing at an epidemic pace. The
growth in homicide rates has affected countries
with historically low rates such as Costa Rica and
Argentina, as well as countries with a history of
internal wars and high levels of violence, such as
Colombia or El Salvador.4
It is not our aim to discuss here the causes of this
increase in the levels of violence but the
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responses that have emerged and their
limitations. However, it is worth highlighting
that only in some cases the levels of violence are
linked to the legacy of fought wars or, as in
Colombia, partially fed by the ongoing conflict.
But in all cases, violence and a sense of
insecurity are being fostered by the opportunities
offered by globalisation for illegal trafficking of
drugs and arms, by the negative effects of forced
implementation of neoliberal reforms in deeply
unequal societies, by intergenerational processes
of violence transmission, by the failure of current
public policies and state institutions, by the
expansion of a dominant consumption-orientated
culture and by a problematic and manipulated
socialisation of youth in both the global South
and the North.5
It is in this context that public security provision,
as it is conceived now, is proving ever more
inadequate for the task. It is not only inadequate
in terms of the quantity and resources dedicated
by the state to protect communities, but also in
the quality of the provision and its assumptions
about the best way to tackle insecurity. In many
cases, the state does not have a legitimate
monopoly of violence and certainly not over the
entire territory, and where there is provision, it
often abuses rather than protects the population.
In some contexts, the crisis has led to the
emergence of parallel communities where coercion is
exercised outside the institutional framework of
the state. This is the case even where states are
relatively strong (e.g. Brazil) as well as where
they are weak (e.g. Guatemala). In these
communities the state is not normally capable of
providing basic services, including security, and
its intervention is often intermittent, reactive
and disciplinary rather than protective. One of
the characteristics of these parallel communities
is that state institutions such as the police are
not the main, best equipped, or even desirable
providers of protection. Alternative actors often
connected to lucrative illegal or informal
economic activities replace the state and often
act interchangeably as coercive ‘protectors’ for
some sectors of the population, creating
protection rackets.
In these communities, the state–society
relationship is often characterised by mutual
distrust and even resentment. One of the most
critical examples of areas where coercive
protection is provided outside the institutional
frontier of the state is the case of Comuna 13 in
Medellin, the second biggest city of Colombia.
For more than three decades, armed groups have
fought for the control of this area. Citizens living
there have demanded protection from the violent
domination exerted by the armed groups,
including threats, murders, massacres and forced
displacement. Their desperate demands for
protection have been temporarily met by
successive armed groups that replace their
opponents, only to use similar techniques in their
attempt to exterminate them and to gain control
of the territory and of their people.
It was not until 2002 that the state attempted to
retake control through a military operation.
Given the excessive violence used, this state
intervention was initially difficult to differentiate
from the many other interventions by coercive
actors in the past. However, Operación Orion, as
it was called, has been seen as a successful step
towards the pacification of the Comuna 13.
Nevertheless, six years later it is evident that the
intervention has not managed to remove the
deep causes of violence in the Comuna. It is not
yet clear whether the state is the only effective
provider of security in the area, or the reduction
in the number of crimes is due to a deep
transformation in the community. Although the
local government has tried to reform traditional
politics, supported the demobilisation of former
combatants and opened spaces to local
participation, in terms of security, the police and
other state bodies still do not have absolute
control over the situation. There are powerful
actors in the city who people still fear, who
provide some sort of order and decide the fate of
whoever is seen as a threat to their interests.
The crisis in security provision makes more
problematic the lack of connection between the state’s
objectives and local communities’ needs. In the context
of violence, communities need to be protected
and helped to build more secure environments.
However, public security provision tends to focus
on eliminating enemies or competitors to state
territorial control and not on mitigating the
perverse effects of insecurity and violence on
people’s lives. Sometimes the methods used by
the police and military forces increased unrest,
fear and insecurity among the local population.
Lack of communication between communities
and police institutions not only makes it harder
Abello Colak and Pearce ‘Security from Below’ in Contexts of Chronic Violence14
2AbelloColak40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:18  Page 14
to identify priorities for responsive security
provision but also detracts from the legitimacy of
the methods used by the state in ‘securing or
pacifying’ dangerous areas.
In Colombia in 1994, surveys were carried out to
ask citizens their views on the service provided by
the police, which revealed systematic distancing
between the police and local communities.
Recognition of this has, in some cases, promoted
the implementation of community-policing
approaches. These contain seeds of an alternative
way of seeing public provision, as measured, for
instance, by whether people feel secure, rather
than the number of criminals arrested. However,
in practice, community police are often not
valued by the rest of the police, undermining the
trust in them. In Medellin, we found that the
community police were seen as the ‘soft’ even
‘feminised’ side of the hard, masculine and ‘real’
policeman’s work; their reputation was useful
when police colleagues were needed to be
deployed in the community or gather
intelligence, but it then eroded when community
police were included in police military style
operations (Abello Colak and Pearce 2008).
Another symptom of the crisis is the exaggerated
social expectation from applying hardline measures.
Given the desperation for relief from insecurity,
many groups are not only adopting aggressive
attitudes towards crime but are also supporting a
more aggressive state response towards
insecurity problems. Hardline responses are
focused on increasing police patrols and attacks
on ‘dangerous areas’ and are implemented by
targeting ‘suspicious individuals’. In Central
America, where the problem of gangs is out of
hand, responses have included increasing
sentences, reducing the age limit for arrests in
order to prosecute younger offenders, and
enabling police to arrest people on suspicion of
belonging to a gang. In some cases, having a
tattoo has become a determining factor for being
arrested. Other responses have been urban
military operations on areas seen as dangerous,
like those carried out in Colombia and Chiapas,
Mexico, with summary executions as the outcome.
Hardline measures give rise to three sets of
problems: (1) they exacerbate social tensions
through their reactive and punitive targeting of
certain social groups ‘problematic communities’;
(2) they deepen existing gaps between the level
of protection that different sectors of society
receive from the state; and (3) they delay
reforms to security provision that could make it
more preventive and less reactive, and impede
dealing with fundamental problems. As the case
of Medellin shows, hardline measures can give
the initial impression that the state is tackling
the security problems, but they cannot prevent
future violence. Rather, a tense calm is created
until new groups emerge.
From a citizen’s perspective, public security is
failing, especially in the most violent contexts
and where protection from physical attack is
needed. However, security remains important to
the survival of citizens and communities, and
some responses to the crisis have emerged. Some
of these are led by the market for protection and the
commoditisation of security, others are responses led
by communities and others are responses led by
international donor agencies. In the next section we
explore the main features of these responses and
their limitations.
3 Responses to the crisis in security provision
3.1 Market-led initiatives
One of the most lucrative businesses, in the
context of violence, is the provision of security.
The market for protection is growing and
becoming highly competitive. A growing number
of private companies are offering protection to
national and multinational businesses, banks and
individuals. The privatisation of security is not
an exclusive phenomenon of the global South. In
the European Union, Canada and Austria, the
number of private guards has already exceeded
the number of police officers (Richani 2002).
However, in the context of chronic violence,
leaving security in the hands of the market runs a
greater risk. The creation of a private space for
the profitable provision of security can be easily
manipulated by powerful coercive actors. In some
cases, the state supervises the process, but not in
ways that are democratically accountable or
transparent. One example is the experience of
Las Convivir created in Colombia. These were
private forms of security, supervised and
authorised by the state with around 9,633 men. In
rural areas they were quickly controlled by
powerful elites and narco-businesses to serve their
interests and to cover more vicious forms of
private security already in place, like paramilitary
forces. In highly insecure contexts it is very
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difficult for a weak state to ensure that criminal
actors do not co-opt the very lucrative private
security business. By profiting from insecurity, the
latter can also further undermine the state’s
capacity to improve public provision. In Colombia,
almost $150 million annually is being spent on
private security (Richani 2002: 92); money which
could finance better police forces through taxes
and to improve the public security sector.
The other problem with the privatisation of
security is that protection becomes a commodity
and even a privilege. Deciding what is punishable,
what is worth protecting, by what means and
based on which values cannot be the result of a
decision left to the market or private interests.
Whoever is capable of providing security in a
given society is also entrusted with power and has
leverage to impose a specific social order by
managing social conflict and deciding what is
acceptable or punishable. In Colombia, this
means that paramilitary groups, even ones which
have officially been demobilised, often impose
rigid social norms around dress and behaviour in
the areas they control. Similar patterns have
been found in other areas of the world where
community authority is under de facto
paramilitary, militias or drugs lord control. It is
the poorest communities that are most exposed.
3.2 Community-led initiatives
There are other responses originating in
community initiatives. Some are based on
traditional indigenous values and on a long
history of local conflict management within
communities. Some of these traditional forms of
justice and conflict management may conflict
with Western values and understandings of the
state. Customary law is sometimes in tension
with state justice and security, with mutual
denials of legitimacy, while elsewhere customary
law and state institutions may coexist with
customary law acknowledged and recognised by
the state. These forms of justice provision are
sometimes the only available forms of security in
violent contexts and need to be recognised. They
respond to the immediate concern of how to
create some sort of immediate order and seem to
be good at responding to local needs. However,
they may also be rigid and reproduce traditional
discriminations on ethnic or gender lines. It is
important to explore the values behind them,
how they respond to minority rights and what
kind of relation they can have with the state.
There are other more extreme community
responses to wrongdoing, such as street justice
and lynchings in rural (and sometimes urban)
communities in countries like Guatemala. These
highlight in a dramatic way, the extent of the
failure of security and justice provision, as well as
how the sense of abandonment in communities
can lead to even more violence. In the end, such
kinds of responses leave communities vulnerable
to manipulation and facilitate their
stigmatisation by other sectors of society that
consider them savage, primitive and ignorant.
We would like to highlight, however, that
sometimes other (more positive) forms of
community-led responses to violence can emerge.
We have witnessed how people can organise
themselves and stand up to violence in countries
like Colombia and Guatemala, where civil society
organisations have tried to create spaces for
action that delegitimise violent actors (Pearce
2007b). There are numerous examples of how civil
society participation is promoting social change,
fostering municipal development initiatives and
improving women’s capacity to participate and to
challenge political and social violence.
Greater participation does not immediately or
automatically translate into a change in security
provision, but it affects the way in which state
and society interact – potentially affecting
assumptions about what the state should do and
protect and, in consequence, about the kind of
state that is being constructed. Community and
civil society participation is prompted by the
desire to defend fundamental rights and to
empower people to act against conditions that
are seen as life or livelihood threatening. Such
participation can help to build public opinion, to
disseminate a sense of rights, to encourage
people to challenge the status quo and to engage
citizens in addressing issues of security, human
rights and the rule of law (Pearce 2007b).
3.3 International donor agency-led initiatives
The third kind of response to the crisis in security
provision is led by donor agencies through their
support to security sector reforms (SSRs). Their
focus is on state institutional transformation.
Such reforms, however, suffer from their lack of
local embeddedness. In some cases, like in
Guatemala, they have had qualified success in
fostering cooperation between civil society
organisations and state institutions in designing
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security policy (although in a weak state context,
such as Guatemala, this does not easily impact on
actual public security provision). But this does
not mean a better connection between the state
and the wider society (Pearce 2006). In fact, civil
society organisations have tended to become less
responsive to the needs of local communities,
especially in rural areas. SSRs have focused more
on training and adoption of new values by police
and military institutions, but less on supporting
communities and citizens to gain their own
understanding of issues and build their own
consensus on the kind of security they need.
In sum, none of the three responses discussed
totally addresses the problem. Security provision
needs to be based on agreed norms compatible
with universal values, equitably provided and
should be responsive to local needs. Some
community-led responses are trying to tackle the
issue of lack of effective provision and draw on
indigenous values. However, they cannot respond
to the complex challenges and problems that
create insecurity in this century without
improved state provision. To tackle insecurity
today, it is necessary to develop robust political
commitment, strong anti-corruption
enforcement to prevent mafias from permeating
institutions and urgent attention to the
socioeconomic contexts of insecurity.
4 Rethinking ‘security from below’
We suggest, therefore, that we need to progress
beyond these different modes of crisis response,
and reaffirm that security be regarded and
provided as a public service! The idea of rethinking
‘security from below’ is not a suggestion for the
replacement of the state. The latter is still the
only actor that could guarantee that public goods
and services are provided, and not sold or
administered according to the rational choice
logic that guides markets. ‘Security from below’ is
a call to increase the capacity of people to think
about their security and to define collectively the
values and norms that should inform state
provision. It is a call to find ways to increase
accountability of the state, not to foreign
investors or economic elites, but to common
citizens. It is also an attempt to increase the
capacity of communities and local level actors to
articulate their demands for a better security
provision under democratic principles in which
security must be at the heart of all struggles for
equitable development and social justice.
In order to rethink security and to develop new
practices, academic research on security needs to
develop a better understanding of the daily
experiences of victims of insecurity and also of
police officers working in contexts of violence. The
analysis of security provision requires research
that is commensurate with the complex reality on
the ground. To help people to think about the
norms and values which should serve as
foundations for public provision of security and to
improve their capacity to control it, it is necessary
to get closer to people’s everyday lives in violent
contexts and to the difficult work of police officers
and other state officials in such contexts. While
there are many abusive and corrupt officers, our
work with the community police in Medellin
suggested that many are devoted to public and
community service but that the prevailing police
structures are a disincentive to their endeavour.
We believe that research methodologies
involving people in the co-production of
knowledge6 in the field of security could help to
increase the possibilities of articulating
alternative visions of security that are locally
relevant and that can have an impact on public
institutions. Action research can also have an
impact on society’s capacity, as well as on state
willingness to agree on norms and values for a
more efficient form of security provision.
Encouraging people to think about their security
can enable problem areas to be recognised and
addressed: for example, the fact that men and
women, old, poor and privileged experience
insecurity in different ways, means that provision
should be adapted to particular needs. People
can also be encouraged to think of which local
values or local capacities can inform public
security policies; in some cases this will include
indigenous ways of conflict management.
Mainstream approaches could learn from some
of these time-honoured experiences.
The greater intensity with which insecurity
affects people’s lives demands new thinking and
new practices. The idea of ‘security from below’
could help state institutions to open channels to
communicate with communities and to respond
to local needs. There are examples of how
opening institutional and political spaces for
participation encourages civil and community
actors to communicate differently with the state
and to build better oversight of state institutions.
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In Medellin for example, advances have been
made with monitoring mechanisms for the
municipal development plan that allow social
organisations and the private sector to have a say
in the municipal planning process. Such
accountability mechanisms could be adapted and
extended to security issues. Of course, this would
require a cooperative attitude from the state and
support from political authorities. Such was the
case in Medellin, with the election of
independent Mayor Fajardo and the use of the
constitutional recognition of participatory
planning systems achieved in Colombia in 1991.
We hope that the idea of ‘security from below’ can
encourage academics, authorities, communities
and civil society organisations to think about
security in a different way. We also hope it can
help the latter to articulate their needs from the
perspective of their lived experiences. They need
to participate in debate about the local and
universal values that should inform policing
approaches and state responses. Nevertheless
some civil society organisations resist
participation in debates about security; they see
security as the domain of the conservative
political right that is more interested in
preserving social order than in social change.
Resistance from within state security institutions
can also be expected. These attitudes need to be
overcome so that people with agendas for social
change take the security dimensions of these
agendas seriously and help to strengthen a public
provision which will guarantee freedom to
challenge the status quo by democratic means.
5 Conclusion
We stress the need to recognise that security is
something more than eliminating threats to
human and social life. It is a public service that
should be fairly and effectively provided by the
state through mechanisms that guarantee the peaceful
management of social conflict and the de-escalation of
violence. These mechanisms should comply with
three requirements: they should be informed by
universal as well as local values and respectful of human
rights; they should be agreed by society and responsive to
local needs and they should not create more fear or
insecurity among populations. ‘Security from below’
has nothing to do with vigilantism or de facto
civilian responses to their insecurity.
In the context of complex urban and rural
violence, accountable, effective and inclusive
public security, which does not create more fear
in its implementation, is a vital component in
enabling the poorest to rebuild their
communities and reduce the violence within
them. The lack of basic physical security is an
impediment to social change and progress in the
poorest communities of the global South and the
North that affects the lives of all in society. Daily
violence and crime affect human interactions,
democratic participation and public life. These
problems are increasingly affecting
neighbourhoods and communities, and they are
linked to global dynamics as well as national and
local problems. In the face of inadequate and
inefficient forms of public security provision, new
forms of provision will continue to appear, some
of them in the form of a lucrative business, and
not driven by social public interest.
We hope that the development of ‘security from
below’ thinking and practice can help to prevent
the manipulation of people’s fear and desire for
protection for political or economic purposes. It
focuses our attention on the lived experiences of
insecurity and how people can shape their
security on the basis of their own needs as well as
universal norms, and be empowered to demand it
from the state.
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Notes
1 This was the term used in the Colloquium for
Global Security Transformation, which took
place in Sri Lanka in September 2007.
2 By chronic violence we refer to the context in
which rates of violent death are at least twice
the average for high- and low-income
countries, respectively; where these levels are
sustained for five years or more and where
frequent acts of violence are recorded across
several socialisation spaces, including the
household, the neighbourhood, the school,
intercommunity and the nation-state
(including disproportionate acts of violence
attributed to state security forces) (Pearce
2007b).
3 The Final Report ‘Human Security Now’
published by the Commission on Human
Security in 2003 is a good example of how the
problems of the global South are reshaping the
security agenda. It identifies six critical issues
on human security: protecting people caught
2AbelloColak40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:18  Page 18
up in violent conflict, protecting people on the
run, especially migrant and displaced
populations, protecting people in countries
recovering from violent conflict, protecting
people from poverty, recognising the link
between health and security and guaranteeing
access to basic education and knowledge.
4 Although there are variations across the
region, the general tendency has been towards
increased violence and the countries with the
highest homicide rates are El Salvador, where
the number of deaths per year in the 1990s
exceeded the average during the war in the
1980s, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil.
5 Young men in particular are affected by lack
of self-esteem (Pearce 2007b). On gender
issues in violence, see Pearce (2007a).
6 Co-producing knowledge recognises different
kinds of knowledge that can be brought to
bear on a problem and engages thinkers and
practitioners in a joint endeavour to develop
new knowledge relevant to context. Different
kinds of knowledge range from the academic
forms of propositional and analytical
knowledge to the experiential knowledge of
actors in their contexts.
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